THE UNTOLD STORY

THE UNTOLD STORY

From  “THE DISCOVERY OF THE BLACK HAND-MADE GLOVE” [between late Dec1972 and early Jan1973]  to “THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT” [ on 20^th October 1973]

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

1. There were already a lot of stories written about Bong Kee Chok [BKC] and

    Operation Sri Aman. The story below is not about “blowing-own-trumpet. The PURPOSE

    is to tell my personal side of the story [or personal experiences] about what happened

    before BKC was forced to come out to “talk and sign the peace” agreement with

    GOM [Government of Malaysia] on 20 ^th October 1973.

2. It must be mentioned  here that there were other former SB officers out there who

   rather keep their own stories and experiences [in fighting the menace of subversive

   and militant communist threats in Second Division ]to themselves  . I know some of

   them. In connection with “The Untold Story”, I am proud to mention three of my brother-

   SB officers who were in “the-know” somehow [notwithstanding the SB ethic of “need-to-

   know-basis”] about what happened between Dec 1972 and October 1973.  They were:

(i)  Rtd. ACP Jeffrey Peron Samen who was then  Divisional Special Branch Officer  of Second (now Sri Aman) Division

(ii)  Rtd. DCP Dato’ Peter Nyomek Ngeap who was then DSBI Engkilili

(iii) Rtd. SAC (I) Dato’ Gingkoi P. Seman  who was then DSBI Lubok Antu.

3. They were also many unsung heroes who had done covertly and excellently well in their

    respective SB assignments. To them I dedicate this untold story now. In particular the

    following persons who had served faithfully.

(i) The late SB Contract Insp. Kho Miu Teck;

(ii)The late SB Det. Sgt. Major Yeo Bujang  and the late B/S Cpl. Mandoh who

     managed to outdo and captured one CT in an armed combat while on discreet 

     investigation on CTs  movement in Ulu Paku in Batu Lintang Undop

     Simanggang  (?? 965/1966.)  The capture of the CT led to the surrender of his

     [CT's own] wife who  managed to escape during the scuffle;

(iii)The late Det. Sgt. Maj. Sigai Anak Kalom;

(iv) The late SB Det. Sgt. Chong Wen Sang;

(v)  Retired SB Det. Sgt. Major Albert Makin; (vi)The late B/S Sgt. Jemat of Lubok

      Antu –KIA during probing mission between  Sg. Kayan and Sg. Butan in Matang-

      Sempadi complex in 1978;

(vi) The late B/S Sgt. Lanyau of Engkilili.

(vii)The two brothers: the late B/S Cpl. Kaik anak Peng. Ngali and retired B/S 

       Cpl. Bullik Anak Peng. Ngali

(viii)The late SB Driver Cpl. Kalom Anak Stang.

4.  THE UNTOLD STORY has four parts for easy reading. Some events are written in point

     forms (to cut the long story short). Please take note also all the events mentioned

     happened in their sequences within the period [i.e between December 1972 and

     October 1973]. The time/dates/months of their occurrences are approximated from

     memories in the absence of my official dairy books [1972/1973].

Part I – The Discovery of the Black Hand-Made Glove

Part II – The Immediate Security Alert ....

Part III –The SB Covert Operations

Part IV – My historic Lunch with Bong Kee Chook (BKC) and Alli Kawi

Part V – Conclusion

5. At the advice of Rtd. DCP Dato” Peter Nyomek Ngeap,  Mr. James Ritchie [my friend]

   interviewed me sometime in late 2010 on what I knew about BKC. During the interview,

  James said he was writing his (new) book on BKC in connection with Operation Sri Aman.

  Also, he said he had already interviewed Rtd. ACP Jeffrey Peron [who is now residing in

  Bandar Sri Aman). I told James briefly about what happened before BKC came out to sign

  the Peace Agreement on 20^th October 1973. Part of this : "The Untold Story" may also

  appear in his book.

 

6.  FINALLY, what I write in the story are facts based on my personal experiences during the course of my involvements during the period. With the history behind all the happenings, I am writing the story in good faith and in the belief that it constitutes neither breach of SB Charter nor breach of security of the state.

The story is just My Memoirs.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞

PART I -  THE DISCOVERY OF THE BLACK HAND-MADE GLOVE

In December 1972, SB (Serian and Pantu) received sighting reports on movements of unknown number of armed communist terrorists (CTs)  believed to be members of PGRS (Pasukan  Guerrilla  Rakyat Sarawak) operating in Balai Ringin area [in Serian District] opposite Pantu [in Simanggang District] .  Following verification of reports, SB ground investigations and mounted about two months covert operations within Balai Ringin –Sabal Kruin-Pantu complex between December 1972 and January 1973. I was personally involved in some parts being the DSBI [District Special Branch Inspector] Pantu/Simanggang then.

Actual sequence of events (approximated from my memories)

(1) One day about late December 1972/early January 1973 one team of SB’s STF

(Special  Tasks Force) led by Chief Inp. LCS was despatched to locate the CTs hideouts  in  the area  of Sabal Keruin in Balai Ringin.

(2) About after mid day, one CT was seen fetching water from the river. Upon drawing nearer,  the STF team was fired from behind by one CT on sentry duty  on  “empra” [make-do-tree- top-observation post] or sentry post. The STF boys returned fire simultaneously and also shot the CT who was at the bank of the river. The  CT died instantly, while the one on sentry jumped down and escaped. The dead male CT  was identified as Lee Eng Tuan. He was former teacher in Chung Hua Primary School Pantu  [about 1959-1962].

(3) About fifty meters away from the river, the STF team discovered on camp just abandoned by a group of about seven persons. It was about one to two weeks old. 

(4)The group of CTs escaped immediately for an unknown destination. The camp was believed that of PGRS groups whose operational area was First (now Kuching & Semarahan ) Division.

(5)Through further search around the vicinity, the STF boys discovered another bigger camp strategically located and well-guarded about fifty meters away from the first camp.  It was also about one month old and could accommodate about fifteen to twenty people.

(6) The DISCOVERY OF THE BLACK HAND-MADE GLOVE was right at the centre of the camp. The discovery confirmed that Bong Kee Chok (a.k.a Tien Shak Min by NCKP or  Commander Yusof by TNKU] was in the camp. He wore glove to cover his [right] hand as protection for he lost his pointing finger as a result of explosion from home-made grenade (bomb).

(7)  The discovery of the glove was an “information of immediate operational value”.  Bong Kee Chok was in the camp and managed to escape. Until the finding, it was believed that BCK was hiding somewhere in Sarawak/Indonesian border area between Pantu and  Balai Ringin.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞

PART II - THE IMMEDIATE SECURITY ALERT ....

(1) The finding of the glove sparked off immediate security alert, mobilization and   intensive military operations between Balai Ringin and Engkilili complex.

(2) Twenty four hours military patrol along the roads for about three months between Balai Ringin/Pantu/Simanggang/ Engkilili.

(3)  Immediate Police road blocks were mounted simultaneously at the following

     locations for  few months.

(i)    Serian/Simanggang Road at Pantu Road Junction

(ii)   Serian/Simanggang Road at Lachau Road Junction

(iii)  Junction of Simanggang/Serian/Sibu Road

(iv)   Simanggang/Sibu Road at Batu Lintang Road Junction

(v)    Simanggang/Sibu Road at Engkilili Road Junction

(vi)   Simanggang/Sibu Road at Lubok Antu Road Junction

(4)   Deployment of troops into the likely and suspected escape routes to

       Sarawak/Indonesia Border areas.

(5)  Deployment of troops in selected localities in Balai Ringin, Pantu, Lachau, Selepong,

       Engkeramut, Nyelam, Po Ai, Batu Lintang Undop and Engkilili areas.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞

PART III - THE SB COVERT OPERATIONS

Objective: BCK and his men must be “netted”

 Covert Operation code-named: “Rahman I”

Through the stages of the covert operation (which we called “Rahman I” –after the name of Director of SB in KL then) I personally led “The Chasing Team” consisted of three STF boys [each armed with AR 15 auto rifle] and three Border Scouts [each armed with Sterling SMG] and one PFF-radio-operator [armed with SMG Sterling]. I carried my service-issued handgun and one (captured) AK47 rifle. We were in plain-cloth and dressed like “kampong folks” carrying our personal effects and foodstuffs using “ladong or selabit” and “engkalang or agak” instead of military haversacks.

The Chase began from early January until April 1973

(i) At Genting Rajang - by the boundary of 1^st &2^nd Division near Bukit Kawi Abok, Pantu

(ii) At Bukit Tunggal – near Kpg. Empaling/Kpg. Tekyuong Pantu

(iii) Sungai Mansau – about 5  km away from  Kpg. Marau Kelasau, Pantu

 (iv) Selantik Betong area– about 6 km away from Sg. Mansau / 10 km away from Pasar Pantu.  

(v) Sg. Tebelian/ Rapak Tepus/Rapak Penyau/Rapak Gelu   complex

(vi) Along Kara Road [Bangkong/Kandis/Pintau/Lachau complex

(vii) Empili/Punggu/Gua/Selepong/Nyelam/Klauh/Engkeramut/Po’ Ai /Melugu complex.

From traces on the ground, the CTS split tactically into several smaller [sparrow] groups after the contact with STF in Sabal Keruin/Balai Ringin.

Below is an outline of the CTs movements [obtained after the surrender of BSY, FKC, SK and BKK)

The smaller group from the first camp was led by Bong Sai Ying [BSY] who was the Political Commissar of PARAKU I & PARAKU II] and her husband named Fam Kwok Chang (FKC). The husband and wife proceeded to the main road heading for Engkilili, while two other groups (including one group of 3 Indonesian Dayaks) were to proceed to Batu Lintang and border area.

The bigger group from the second camp was led by BCK. The group split further into three smaller groups and to RV (rendezvous)  at Sg. Mansau, and subsequently at Selantik Betong  [located about 10 km away from Pantu Bazaar toward Tembawai Pulu and the old Rapak Tepus village].  The groups were unable to escape toward the border area because of intensive military movements along the main road and border patrols. The groups were forced to go by north-west direction with Simanggang/Serian  reference point toward Simanggang, Batu Lintang and Engkilili.

The “Failed Ambush” at Bukit Bangku

A group of about three CTs were to have come near one particular rubber-garden  to  collect foodstuffs from certain food-dump between 11.00 pm and 2.a.m  that night. They did not turn up that night. I personally led that “Failed Ambush” at Bukit Bangku by Jalan Gamang about 4 km from Pasar Simanggang in early May 1973. Our source played “double game”.

I was informed by XXX after his surrender that “they smelled” our ambush position and dare not come. Instead they joined another group to collect larger amount of foodstuff including one large sack of rice from another food dump located near Kpg. Gelam at the end of Gamang Road, Simanggang.

Police Field Force - PFF

 Also in late one afternoon in early May 1973, there was a “Fire Fight” between one   section of PFF [from 14 Bn “B” Coy of Temudok Camp led by Sgt. Jaroh Anak Jarit , and Cpl. Jackson Anak Nyipa]  and one group of unknown number of CTs in the peat-swamp topography near Sg. Entulang [about 5km from Temudok Camp] and about 4 to 5 km from behind Police Station & Complex and Pasar Simanggang. There was no casualty. The group fled.  

Covert Operation code-named: “Rahman II” 

The “PUKAT” (net) at “seberai’ (across) Pasar Engkilili -  Bong Sai Ying (BSY) and her husband Fam Kok Chiang (FKC) went into the net, sent message and surrendered to SB Engkilili through the arrangement with BSY's father  [Bong Nam Siong] Their appeal to BCK and remenants  of PARAKU I and PARAKU II to surrender were voice-recorded (in Chinese language) and broadcasted from the air using RMAF Nuri helicopter and Charlie Air craft. Simultaneously, hundreds of surrender-appeal leaflets signed by BSY and FKC with their  photos and were released from the air over  the area between Engkilili-Batu Lintang-Undup Tengah-Simanggang-Pantu and Balai Ringin and along the border area. 

Some of the leaflets were picked up by some members of the armed CTs while  the recorded voices of appeal to surrender were heard by the main and splinter groups as well.

The combination of SB covert operations, psychological warfare (or psyops)  and military operations were effective in “netting” BSY and FKC and demoralizing remnants of the CTs. The main group led by BKC were immobilized in Sepatak/Empangu/Bayai area  because of the intensive military presence and tight cordon.

Insp. Nyomek Ngeap (now Dato’ Rtd. DCP) was the DSBI Engkilili, and the late Det. Sgt. Chong Wen Sang (who was Corporal in rank then) were involved in the  covert operation in Engkilili jointly mounted by SB Engkilili/STF team from SBHq. Kuching.

The ARREST OF “SOO KWANG” or SK [BKC’s 2nd Bodyguard] at Engkilili Bus Stand was made by DSBI Nyomek Ngeap about mid-morning on 12th  October1973. From body search, SK carried no weapon and no document. However, from interrogation [to extract tactical intelligence of immediate  operational value], SK claimed the he was personal peace-emissary of BCK, and revealed that another peace-emissary was BKC’s own brother named Bon Kee Kuen [BKK]. Both of them walked out of the tight military cordon successfully under cover of darkness. They came out to the road side near Bayai, walked  and went inside to one [pre-arranged] motor vehicle already waiting at the location. SK and BKK were driven off.  SK went out of the vehicle [still in darkness] after Balai Polis Engkilili  and walked toward Engkilili bus stand. The plan for him then was to proceed by bus to Sarikei [to convey the peace message to the authority]  by contacting his family in his home village in Sarikei. Pending the arrival of SB supporting team from SB HQ, DSI Nyomek Ngeap did his job excellently.  SK was taken SB safe-house in Kuching. As for BKK, he was driven from Engkili to Simanggang bus stand in the same vehicle. The plan was for BKK to board Serian-bound bus on the same peace mission through his family in 27th Mile Kuching-Serian Road.  From information from SB Engkilili, BKK was arrested at the road block mounted at Pantu Road Juncrion by the late SB Det. Cpl. Keloni Anak Singkin.

The ARREST OF “BONG KEE KUEN”or BKK [BKC’s younger brother] at SB mounted-roadblock at Pantu Rd. Junction was made by the late SB Det. Cpl Keloni Anak Singkin late afternoon 12th October 1973. Cpl. Keloni was directed to take and keep BKK into a certain house nearby the road block until the arrival of SB team from SBHQ. Kuching. Meanwhile, late Contract Insp. Kho Muit Teck and I rushed from Simanggang to Pantu to attend to the arrest. BKK was unarmed [I remember his look was slim and thin. He wore dark long-sleeve shirt and dark khaki trousers and wore old rubber shoes]. According to Cont. Kho Mui Teck, BKK claimed he had one “sealed” document to be handed to the authority.  SB team from SB HQ Kuching came about half an hour after my arrival and took  BKK  away to SB safe-house in Kuching.

          

  

Immediately after the arrest of SK and BKK, the “STAY PUT ORDER” was communicated to the ground troops who were manning tight cordon and patrolling around Sepatak-Empangu/-Bayai complex [or Undop Tengah]. It was confirmed that BCK and his group were already enclosed in ‘The Pukat’ According to the late ASP Michael Menggong Anak Panggit [GM], the order was very frustrating  for him and his Border Scout troops on the ground. They were already ready to go for the “kill”.

Through security intelligence assessment (at that time), there was a secret plan for leaders of PGRS, PARAKU I (which became 330 Combat Unit) & PARAKU II  (split into two and became:  117 Combat Unit & 1026 Combat Unit) and PARAKU III to meet to discuss the progress and future of NKCP militant struggles.

The plan was ‘confirmed’ by information extracted from recorded statements of certain Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs).  The information also appeared to collaborate with the ‘secret purpose’ on the part of BKC in despatching his personal emissaries [SK and BKK] to make contact with splinter groups of PRGS [led by Wong Hon ] operating in Balai Ringin in the First Division,  and with splinter groups of PARAKU III [led by Hung Choo Ting] operating particularly in Sarikei District in the Third Division, .

The two prong-strategies for both SK and BKK were:

(i) In the event that anyone of them was caught, they were to say to the authority

     that  BCK was ready to talk peace.

(ii) If both were not caught, SK was to contact PARAKU III group operating in  Sarikei to

     create military incident as decoy to enable BCK and the man group walk out and

     escape from the military cordon. Similarly for BKK. His part was to contact PGRS

     group operating in Balai Ringin to create similar military incident to divert SB/military

     attention away from the cordon area in Sepatak/Bayai Simanggang.

PART IV -  MY HISTORIC LUNCH WITH B.C.K AND Tuan ALLI KAWI took place at The Residency  took place several  days after the arrest of SK and BKK.

I was tasked to wait for the arrival of Tuan Alli Kawi (HSB Sarawak) at The Residency in Simanggang (re-named Rumah Sri Aman after the signing fo the Peace Agreement on 20th October 1973). He arrived at about 10.00 a.m from Kucching. Both of us waited for BKC [the "to-be-tamed" wild guest from the jungle] who arrived in taxi together with SK and BKK at about 10.30 a.m from Sg. Raya near Bayai. While the three of us [BKC, Alli Kawi and myself] had lunch up stair, BKK and SK were downstairs having lunch with the SB team from Kuching. “Latip-cooked” curry-santan chicken, curry-prawn made very sumptuous lunch.  BCK and I had few glasses of beer while Tuan Alli Kawi had  coffee after lunch. I quietly noticed the missing pointing-finger of the right hand of BCK when he took off the black glove off his hand just before lunch. The glove looked he took off was similar by description of the glove was left and found by STF boys during the probing mission in Sabal Keruin in Balai Ringin in late December 1972.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞

PART V - CONCLUSION

That was the first and last time I saw BCK in person. My few attempts to reach BCK lately (through XXX and former STF XXX & his wife XXX) were not successful.  Also I was not able to reach his younger brother named BKL (not BKK) to reach BCK.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞

It was reliably learned [many years later] that few high ranking politicians from SUPP were involved in negotiating the surrenders of armed CTs with Tun Andul Rahman Yakob (who was the CM then). It was also believed that SUPP gained much political leverage and mileage from negotiating the surrender with Tun Rahman. As part of the bargains, SUPP  became very influential in formulating certain aspects of the economic and development plans then within the state Coalition Government.

It was a known fact that SUPP was heavily infiltrated and used by subversive elements of NKCP  (or SCO) then as its main political front to promote Chinese-orientiated communism in Sarawak.

∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞